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Abstract
The far-reaching economic effects of the pandemic provide an opportunity to
study the responses of corporations to exogenous shocks and the subsequent uncertainty.
I investigate how firm characteristics impact dividend payout and employment policy
changes during the COVID-19 pandemic. I focus on firm characteristics and actions of
Russell 1000 firms in 2020, a year that captures firm behavior before and after the height
of the pandemic. My paper covers three areas: dividend payout policy, employment
policy, and the interaction between the two during an unexpected year defined by
COVID-19. I use bivariate and multinomial logistic regressions to analyze the
relationship between firm characteristics and the outcome variables in my models. My
results indicate that firms with larger debt, greater cash, and fewer growth prospects in
the previous quarter are more likely to cut dividends. I do not find significant firm
determinants of employment cuts. Furthermore, I find that there are few firm
characteristics in my model that define whether a company will choose a policy that
prioritizes shareholders or stakeholders, but firm characteristics are more predictive of
policies in which either employment or dividend payouts were cut while the other was
maintained or increased. I contribute to the divided literature on dividend payout and
employment during times of uncertainty. My research adds to the limited literature on the
interaction of dividend payout and employment policies. I also provide additional
analysis into the actions of companies during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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I. Introduction
The first reported case of the coronavirus (COVID-19) was on December 31,
2019, but COVID-19 took the global stage in the first months of 2020 as the virus spread
rapidly around the world. Once the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a
pandemic on March 11, fear and uncertainty plagued the global economy. Individuals and
countries in every part of the world undertook measures that prioritized virus prevention
often at the expense of economic advancement. Some of the policies that governments
adopted included stay-at-home orders, travel bans, curfews, business restrictions, and
border closures. Companies within the Entertainment and Tourism industry were hit
especially hard because in-person events and travel were halted (Rio-Chanona et al.
2020). The effects of the pandemic, however, both direct and ripple, were felt in every
aspect of the economy. The United States government provided over five million loans to
business owners through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to keep companies
afloat (Ponciano 2020). Furthermore, the unemployment rate in the United States reached
a 21st century all-time high of 14.8% in April 2020 (Falk et al. 2020).
The far-reaching economic effects of the pandemic provide an opportunity to
study the responses of corporations to exogenous shocks and the subsequent uncertainty.
I investigate how firm characteristics impact dividend payout and employment policy
changes during the COVID-19 pandemic. I focus on firm characteristics and actions of
Russell 1000 firms in 2020, a year that captures firm behavior before and after the height
of the pandemic. My paper covers three areas: dividend payout policy, employment
policy, and the interaction between the two during an unexpected year defined by
COVID-19.
6

Using data from COMPUSTAT, I observe year over year quarterly dividend
payout changes from January through December 2020. I take advantage of Just Capital’s
unique COVID-19 Response Tracker to identify firms that laid off or furloughed
employees from March to June 2020.1 This limited time frame shows which companies
chose employment cuts as their immediate response to the pandemic. I use a bivariate
logistic regression model to predict the odds of dividend cuts based on firm
characteristics going into the quarter. Firm characteristics include firm profitability
proxied by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”);
leverage proxied by debt in current and long-term liabilities; cash holdings proxied by the
sum of cash and short-term investments; book-to-market ratio; and firm size proxied by
the log of total assets. I include the same covariates when I regress employment cuts that
took place during the first two quarters of 2020 on firm characteristics from Q1 and Q2
2020. I then combine employment and dividend payout decisions to create four distinct
policy paths firms can take during the pandemic. I regress these policy choices on firm
characteristics from the contemporaneous and lagged quarters to evaluate which
characteristics impact the policies that firms choose. I control for industry fixed effects in
all my regressions.
My results indicate that firms with higher debt, cash holdings, and book-to-market
ratios in the previous quarter are more likely to cut dividends. Less profitable firms are
only slightly more likely to cut dividends, though the effects are so small that they are
empirically insignificant. I find that there are few firm characteristics in my model that

1

The COVID-19 Corporate Response Tracker can be found here: https://justcapital.com/reports/the-covid19-corporate-response-tracker-how-americas-largest-employers-are-treating-stakeholders-amid-thecoronavirus-crisis/
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define whether a company will choose a policy that prioritizes shareholders or
stakeholders, but firm characteristics are more predictive of policies in which either
employment or dividend payouts were cut while the other was maintained or increased.
Such policies are more indicative of firms that are stakeholder or shareholder friendly
since either employment was cut or dividend payouts were cut. I also find earnings before
adjustments in Qt are a statistically significant predictor for all four potential policy
decisions, though the effects are small.

II. Literature Review
2.1 Dividend Payouts and Uncertainty
Dividends are a common form of sharing a firm’s profits with its owners. The
first dividends were paid in the seventeenth century, and dividend payout policy has
changed significantly since then (Freedman 2006). In fact, Lintner’s 1956 work published
after WWII has become pivotal in understanding modern-day dividend policies. Lintner
uses his findings from company surveys and executive interviews to develop a theoretical
model of corporate dividend behavior. He discovers that net-income plays the largest role
in shaping a firm’s target payout ratio – a payout that is strictly adhered to by the firm.
Through his field research, Lintner highlights the executive motivations behind
dividends, emphasizing a sense of obligation to shareholders. The company’s long-term
projected earnings influence their dividend policies, and the ratio between their current
earnings and their current dividend rate shapes the amount dividend payouts change over
time (Lintner 1956).
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Lintner’s research is further supported by Brav et al.’s (2005) research on
dividend policy. Many of the firms they sample start paying dividends as a result of
sustainable earnings growth. Though most firms prioritize maintaining dividend payout
levels over other cash obligations, they declare higher dividends only after investment
and liquidity goals have been achieved. Likewise, Brav et al. (2005) find that 21st century
firms set more payout ratio targets than witnessed in Lintner’s findings a century prior.
Over half a century after Lintner published his work, DeAngelo et al. (2005) built
on his findings by focusing on a firm’s earned/contributed capital mix. The dividend
policies of firms at different stages of their company life cycles indicate a positive
relationship between retained earnings and dividend payouts. Older firms, with higher
retained earnings relative to their total equity and assets, pay higher dividends. In
contrast, companies in earlier stages pay little to no dividends because their biggest cash
obligation is to reinvest profits towards growth (DeAngelo et al. 2005).
Chay and Suh (2009), on the other hand, find that a firm’s long-term cash-flow
trajectory has a larger impact on determining dividend payout policy than the firm’s
earned/contributed capital mix. Their empirical research establishes a strong and negative
correlation between cash-flow uncertainty and dividend payouts by using stock return
and operating profit volatility as a measure of a firm’s cash-flow (Chay and Suh 2009).
Lintner’s research also shines light on the rigidity of modern-day dividend
policies. His findings emphasize managerial preferences for conservatism in setting
dividend payouts (Lintner 1956). Historically the market has reacted negatively to
dividend changes because shareholders see volatility in dividends as a signal of company
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instability. Dividends are sticky, so firms approach investment opportunities with more
adaptability to ensure shareholders can be paid stable dividends (Ibid).
Though most literature depicts managerial motivations instilled in shareholder
loyalty, Wu’s (2018) dynamic agency model sheds light on other dominant incentives.
Managers are likely to smooth dividends because a drop in market value can cost them
their jobs. Executives face layoffs if dividends drop, so they smooth dividends to absorb
the impact of negative quarters on their firm’s shareholder value. Managers will even
squash investing opportunities to continue paying consistent dividends (Wu 2018).
Executives increasingly prefer share repurchases to dividends because they provide firms
with more flexibility (Brav et al. 2005).
Much of the most cited literature on dividend payout policy focuses on long-term
firm projections. However, many authors have studied the effects of uncertainty shocks.
Avramov et al. (2014) find uncertainty shocks and first-moment shocks lead to reductions
or omissions of dividend payouts. The authors use uncertainty-related keywords in
corporate annual reports as a proxy for uncertainty from 2001 to 2010. This time period
captures economic shocks like the 2008 recession and Argentina Peso Crisis. They
implement the same method to observe first-moment shocks and analyze words related to
these shocks (Avramov et al. 2014). These findings are in line with those of Hail et al
(2014) who find dividend payout policies change in response to ambiguity. Hail et al.
(2014) investigated information shocks resulting from changes in insider trading
regulations, and they found firms are more likely to reduce or halt dividends when there
is greater uncertainty due to a regulatory shock to the information environment.
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2.2 Dividend Payouts and COVID-19
The literature on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on dividend payout is
limited and delivers mixed results. The onset of the pandemic in March 2020 shocked the
earnings trajectories of many firms. Mazur et al. (2020) observed the dividend policies of
S&P 1500 firms during the COVID-19 pandemic and found a negative relationship
between dividend yield and earnings. Mazur et al. (2020) defined dividend yield as the
gross quarterly dividend per share on the ex-date over the company’s close price on the
same day. Over 80% of the firms they observed maintained or raised their dividend
payments from Q4 2019 to Q2 2020 regardless of a change in earnings. The rarity of
payout changes during the COVID-19 pandemic is in line with the existing literature on
conservatism and smoothing when declaring dividends (Mazur et al. 2020).
In contrast, Krieger et al. (2020) find that firms, especially those in the Industrials
sector, overwhelmingly cut dividends when the COVID-19 crisis hit. In fact, more firms
in their sample lower or cease dividends in the quarter impacted by the COVID-19
pandemic than any other quarter in the last five years, demonstrating the reactivity of
managers during times of crisis and unexpected jumps in net-income and debt (Krieger et
al. 2020). Similarly, Pettenuzzo et al. (2020) note that more than 100 firms ceased
dividends in March and April 2020. However, they also find that in the same months over
500 firms increased or maintained their dividend payouts. Most of the dividend cuts in
April, which may account for some of the variability in literature because the month of
April is excluded from Mazur et al.’s (2020) sample. Mazur et al. (2020) also look at
fewer firms than Krieger et al. (2020) because they look at dividend-paying firms within
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the S&P 1500, a sample number closer to 1000 firms, while Krieger et al. (2020) include
1400 U.S. dividend-paying firms in their sample.
The authors of these studies used different proxies to measure dividend payouts
which may contribute to their contrasting results. Mazur et al. (2020) observed a firm’s
dividend yield, while Krieger et al. (2020) and Pettenuzzo et al. (2020) analyzed a firms
per share dividend payouts and their total amount of cash allocated to regular quarterly
dividends.
2.3 Employment and Uncertainty
The literature on a firm’s employment and financial stability indicates human
capital is at risk during economic shocks. Avramov et al. (2014) find that first-moment
shocks, which result from tangible changes in a firm's position, lead to employment cuts.
On the other hand, uncertainty shocks have no effect on employment because managers
prefer to wait out the time of ambiguity (Avramov et al. 2014).
Likewise, Alnahedh et al. (2019) observe a negative relationship between
corporate investment, employment, and short-term cash-flow uncertainty. The authors
look at firms in the United States outside of the Utilities and Financials sectors, because
these sectors are highly regulated by the government, from 1971 to 2015. They find that
there is a significant negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and both
corporate investment and employment. Instead of measuring cash-flow by looking at
stock volatility, they measure cash flow uncertainty by creating a time-varying
distribution of cash flows that is based on assets not equity.
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2.4 Employment and COVID-19
COVID-19 led to record breaking employment cuts throughout the world. Béland
et al. (2020) looked at the short-term effects of the pandemic on labor market outcomes
through March 2020. Even in the first months of 2020, the authors found unemployment
rates in the United States increased, while the number of hours worked decreased.
The existing literature uncovers how the economic effects of COVID-19 differed
across countries, industries, and types of workers. Fana et al. (2020) find low-wage and
low-productivity service workers were more likely to face employment volatility. The
authors looked at the effects of the pandemic in European countries.
2.5 Gaps in the Existing Literature
Stakeholder and shareholder theories have been studied in the past, but the
literature on how firm characteristics determine the prioritization and interaction of
dividend payout and employment policies is limited. The relationship between firm
characteristics and dividend payout and employment policy has most commonly been
studied separately. Many of these examples of isolated analysis also exclude COVID-19
from their models or include only the start of 2020. Although discussions on the rise in
unemployment during the pandemic have occurred, employment policy determinants
during the pandemic have not been studied at this point. Furthermore, the findings on
dividend payouts during the pandemic are mixed. Mazur et al. (2020) found a majority of
firms raised dividends during the pandemic, while Krieger et al. (2020) found an
unparalleled number of firms cut or omitted dividend payments. I would like to provide
results that offer additional information on firm policy actions during the pandemic, and I
hope to better understand how firm characteristics increased or decreased the likelihood
13

of dividend and/or employment cuts during a year heavily impacted by the rise and
uncertainty of COVID-19.

III. Data
3.1 Data Collection
I use two sets of data for my analysis. My sample consists of the 928 companies
reviewed by the COVID-19 Corporate Response Tracker from Just Capital. The tracker
consolidates information from company websites, press releases, and news articles and
outlines the policy decisions of companies from the Russell 1000 during the onset of the
pandemic. The Just Capital firm data is limited to company actions taken between March
1 to June 26, 2020. The tracker’s variables of interest for my analysis are decisions
regarding “Furloughs or Unpaid Leave” and “Layoffs.” Furloughs and unpaid leave
consist of temporary work and pay holds, while layoffs describe a company’s decision to
fully terminate an employee contract.
The accounting data used to construct financial variables for my Just Capital firm
sample comes from Wharton Research Data Services’ COMPUSTAT dataset. I pull
North American Quarterly Fundamentals data posted between January 1, 2018 to April 1,
2021 for cash and short-term investments, debt in current liabilities, operating income
before depreciation, dividends per share, total assets, total common/ordinary equity, total
market value, total long-term debt, and GICS sector. I drop companies with missing
COMPUSTAT data values which reduces the firm sample size by 14 companies. I
exclude firms that did not pay regular quarterly dividends from Q1 2019 to Q4 2020. The
resulting firm sample consists of 637 companies.
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In order to best analyze the data within the timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic, I
classify firm-level data from January, February, or March as Quarter 1; April, May, June
as Quarter 2; July, August, or September as Quarter 3; and October, November, or
December as Quarter 4. The number of companies with reported data for the last two
quarters of 2020 is slightly lower than earlier quarters, so my sample decreases slightly
from Q1 2020 to Q4 2020.
3.2 Variable Creation and Description
I create two indicator variables: one to explore differences in dividend policy and
one to explore differences in employment policy. Firms whose quarterly dividends per
share were lower in 2020 compared to the same quarter of 2019 were categorized as
having cut dividends during the COVID-19 pandemic (Dividend Cut). Firms that laid off
or furloughed workers from March 1 to June 26, 2020 were grouped and categorized as
having cut employees (Employment Cut). The time period observed for dividend cuts
includes the entire year of 2020, while the time period for employment cuts captures the
months of March to June in which the global reach of the pandemic became apparent and
escalated rapidly.
To capture firm-level differences that may affect payout and employment policy, I
explore five explanatory variables that are constructed as follows. Operating income
before depreciation, also known as EBITDA, is a proxy for cash-flow uncertainty in my
model. Cash-flow uncertainty is one of the biggest determinants of dividend payouts and
employment stability according to existing literature (Alnahedh et al. 2019). I also
include Cash Holdings, the sum of cash and short-term investments. Proceeding Brav et
al. (2005) findings, that firms with higher debt are more likely to indicate an inclination
15

to pay down debt with money that would be used for dividend payments, I ascribe Debt
as an explanatory variable, and I compute it as the sum of current and long-term debt.
For comparability across firms, EBITDA, Debt, and Cash Holdings are scaled by the
firm’s book value of total assets. Consistent with Brav et al. (2005) financial research, I
include Book-to-Market ratio to account for firm growth, which I calculate as the total
book value of common equity over the total market value of the firm. I choose this metric
instead of the market value to book value of common equity because negative book
values can skew the interpretation of market to book ratios. I control for industry and firm
size effects as well. Firm Size is computed through the logarithm of total assets. I group
companies into 1 of 11 sectors based on GICS sector codes: Energy, Materials,
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials,
Information Technology, Communication Services, Utilities, and Real Estate.2 My

2

The GICS has 11 sector classifications that are as follows. Energy sector includes companies in energy
equipment and services, as well as oil, gas, and consumable fuels. Materials sector includes firms in
chemicals, construction materials, containers and packaging, metals and mining, and paper and forest
products. Industrials sector includes firms in aerospace and defense, building products, construction and
engineering, electrical equipment, industrial conglomerates, machinery, trading companies and distributors,
commercial services and supplies, professional services, air freight and logistics, airlines, marine, road and
rail, and transportation infrastructure. Consumer discretionary sector includes companies in auto
components, automobiles, household durables, leisure products, textiles, apparel and luxury goods, hotels,
restaurants and leisure, diversified consumer services, retail distributors, internet and direct marketing
retail, and multiline and specialty retail. Consumer staples sector includes companies in food and staple
retailing, beverages, food products, tobacco, household products, and personal products. Health care sector
includes firms in health care equipment and supplies, health care providers and services, health care
technology, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and life sciences tools and services. Financials sector includes
firms in banks, thrifts and mortgage finance, diversified financial services, consumer finance, capital
markets, mortgage real estate investment trusts, and insurance. Information technology sector includes
companies in IT services, software, communications equipment, technology hardware, storage and
peripherals, electronic equipment, instruments and components, and semiconductors and semiconductor
equipment. Communication services sector includes firms in diversified and wireless telecommunication
services, media, entertainment, and interactive media and services. Utilities sector includes companies in
electric, gas, water, and multi-utilities, as well as independent power and renewable electricity producers.
Real estate sector includes firms in equity real estate investment trusts, and real estate management and
development (“GLOBAL INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION STANDARD (GICS®) METHODOLOGY”
2020).

16

sample is not equally representative of the 11 GICS sectors. For example, roughly 20% of
my sample are Financial sector firms, while only 3.1% are in Communication Services.
Table 5 and Table 6 report the financial explanatory variable summary statistics for firms
in my sample. The values for the contemporaneous and lagged quarters are very similar
in size.
The frequency at which companies cut dividends in 2020 compared to 2019
increased from Q1 to Q4 as shown in Table 1. This is in line with dividend policy
literature which describes firms’ reluctance to cut dividends unless it is an absolute
necessity. COVID-19 started making headlines at the start of 2020 in Q1, and the severity
of the pandemic and its effect on company performance escalated as the year progressed.
Almost half of my sample cut dividends at some point in 2020. My findings most closely
support those of Krieger et al. (2020) who found firms overwhelmingly cut dividends
during COVID-19. Consequently, they differ from the literature published by Mazur et
al. (2020) that found a majority of firms maintained or increased dividends in 2020.
My data on employment cuts provides information on the decisions of firms
during 2020, Q1 and 2020, Q2. From March (Q1) to June (Q2), 63 companies laid off
workers and 103 furloughed or did not pay employees. Table 2 shows these frequencies.
In total, 20.3% of my company sample made either of these employment cut decisions,
with some firms implementing both policies. Over half of the Consumer Discretionary
firms in my sample cut employees. These firms’ success tends to be pro-cyclical. On the
other hand, there are no Utilities firms in my sample that laid off or furloughed workers.
Consequently, the Utilities industry control is dropped from my employment policy
regression analysis. Industry employment decision breakdowns are shown in Table 4.
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IV. Methodology
I use three regression equations to evaluate dividend and employment policy
differences. I start with an equation to observe if firm characteristics, regardless of
industry, impact the likelihood of cutting dividends during the pandemic. Then, again
controlling for industry, I evaluate if firm characteristics determine the likelihood of a
firm exercising employment cuts as an initial policy response to the pandemic. I drop the
real estate industry variable from my regression due to collinearity, and it becomes the
base-industry outcome for my odds ratio interpretations. Lastly, I combine the nominal
outcome variables to create four policies that dividend-paying firms can employ during
the pandemic: maintain or increase dividends while maintaining or increasing
employment, maintain or increase dividends while cutting employment, cut dividends
while maintaining or increasing employment, or cut dividends while cutting employment.
I run a multinomial logistic regression to model how firm characteristics impact the odds
of each policy outcome.
4.1 Characteristics of COVID-19 Dividend Cutting Firms
I begin with the following regression:
(1)
.- 𝑋-#($0-) + 𝛽
.2 𝑋2#($0-) + 𝛽
.3 𝑋3#($0-) + 𝛽
.4 𝑋4#($0-) + 𝛽
.5 𝑋5#($0-) + 𝛽
.6 𝜗#$ + 𝜖#$ )
𝑌"#$ = ∧ (𝛼* + 𝛽

where 𝑌"#$ is the predicted odds of cutting dividends during 2020 for firm 𝑖. I use a
bivariate logit model since it does not assume a linear relationship. ∧ is a function that
18

converts the linear component of the model into predicted odds. 𝛼 is a constant
representing the outcome when the explanatory variables equal 0. I follow a method used
by Krieger et al. (2020) and use the financial variables from the end of the previous
quarter (𝑄$0- ) as the predictors of dividend cuts in 𝑄$ . This method is appropriate since
.- is the size of the
dividend payout of 𝑄$ is declared at the start of the quarter. Therefore, 𝛽
effect of 𝑋-#($0-), EBITDA from the prior quarter, on predicting the odds of firm 𝑖
.2 is the size of the effect of
exercising dividend cuts in 𝑄$ of the pandemic. Respectively, 𝛽
.3 is the size of the effect of Book-to-Market from 𝑄$0- ,
Debt from 𝑄$0- , 𝑋2#($0-); 𝛽
.4 is the size of the effect of Cash Holdings from 𝑄$0- , 𝑋4#($0-) ; and 𝛽
.5 is the
𝑋3#($0-); 𝛽
size of the effect of Firm Size from 𝑄$0- , 𝑋5#($0-) , on predicting the odds of dividend cuts
in 𝑄$ . 𝜗#$ is a control term representing the 11 firm industries, and 𝜖#$ is an error term.
4.2 Characteristics of Early COVID-19 Employment Cutting Firm
I use a second regression equation:
(2)
.- 𝑋-#<2 + 𝛽
.2 𝑋2#<2 + 𝛽
.3 𝑋3#<2 + 𝛽
.4 𝑋4#<2 + 𝛽
.5 𝑋5#<2 + 𝛽
.6 𝑋6#<- + 𝛽
.= 𝑋=#<- +
𝑌"#$ = ∧ (𝛼* + 𝛽
.> 𝑋>#<- + 𝛽
.? 𝑋?#<- + 𝛽.
.
𝛽
-@ 𝑋-@#<- + 𝛽-- 𝜗#<2 + 𝜖#<2 )

where 𝑌"# is the predicted odds of firm 𝑖 cutting employment as an early response to the
pandemic. Comparable to regression (1), ∧ is a link function, and 𝛼 is a constant. In
contrast to the first equation, I restrict my model to the second quarter of 2020 since my
employment data is limited to March through June 2020. I include predictor variables
measured at the end of the previous quarter𝑄$0- and the same quarter 𝑄$ that firm 𝑖 cut
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employment. I include covariates for firm characteristics in 𝑄2 2020 in addition to those
from 𝑄- 2020because employment cuts are not subject to a schedule, unlike dividend
.- is the size of the effect of EBITDA
payouts. The covariates in my model are as follows: 𝛽
from𝑄2 , 𝑋-#<2 , on predicting the odds of firm 𝑖 implementing employment cuts from
.2 is the size of the effect of Debt from𝑄2 , 𝑋2#<2 ; 𝛽
.3 is the size of the
March to June 2020; 𝛽
.4 is the size of the effect of Cash Holdings
effect of Book-to-Market from𝑄2 , 𝑋3#<2 ; 𝛽
.5 is the size of the effect of Firm Size from𝑄2 , 𝑋5#<2 ; 𝛽
.6 is the size of the
from𝑄2 , 𝑋4#<2 ; 𝛽
.= is the size of the effect of Debt from𝑄- , 𝑋=#<- ; 𝛽
.> is
effect of EBITDA from𝑄- , 𝑋6#<- ; 𝛽
.? is the size of the effect of Cash
the size of the effect of Book-to-Market from𝑄- , 𝑋>#<- ; 𝛽
Holdings from𝑄- , 𝑋?#<- ; 𝛽.
-@ is the size of the effect of Firm Size from𝑄- , 𝑋-@#<- .
𝜗#<2 represents industry controls, and 𝜖#$ is an error term.
4.3 Firm Characteristics for Dividend and Employment Policy Decisions
I create four new variables that represent the unique policy paths companies can
take during the first year of the pandemic. The variables are a combination of the
employment and dividend decisions evaluated in the prior logistic regressions. Firms
have two decisions regarding employment and dividend payout in my model: either cut
the variable of interest OR maintain or increase it. These two options are combined in
four different ways to reflect four distinct COVID-19 policy responses. Policy 1 consists
of firms that maintained or increased both dividends and employment, and Policy 2
represents firms that maintained or increased dividends while cutting employment. Firms
that cut dividends while maintaining or increasing their labor force are grouped into
Policy 3, and Policy 4 is made up of firms that cut dividends and employment during
20

COVID-19. The four policy paths are outlined in the matrix below (Table 9), and the
frequency at which they occur at in my sample is shown in Table 10.

Maintain or Increase
Dividends

Cut Dividends

Maintain or Increase
Employment
Policy 1
Maintain or Increase
Dividends & Maintain or
Increase Employment
Policy 3
(Stakeholder Friendly)
Cut Dividends &
Maintain or Increase
Employment

Cut Employment
Policy 2
(Shareholder Friendly)
Maintain or Increase
Dividends & Cut
Employment
Policy 4
Cut Dividends & Cut
Employment

The majority of firms in my sample chose Policy 1 in 2020. Furthermore, I observe that
the number of firms that implemented Policy 2 is nearly double the number of firms that
chose to implement Policy 3.
I end with the following regression:
(3)
F
[D]
F
[D]
F
[D]
F
[D]
F
[D]
[D] + 𝛽
F
[D] 𝑋
𝑌"#$ = ∧ (𝛼.
+ 𝛽2 𝑋2#$ + 𝛽3 𝑋3#$ + 𝛽4 𝑋4#$ + 𝛽5 𝑋5#$ + 𝛽
𝑋6#($0-) +
6
- -#$
F
[D]
F
[D]
F
[D]
[D]
[D]
𝛽
𝑋=#($0-) + 𝛽
𝑋>#($0-) + 𝛽
𝑋?#($0-) + 𝛽F
𝑋-@#($0-) + 𝛽F
𝜗#<$ + 𝜖#<$ )
=
>
?
-@
--

where there are P possible policy outcomes. Since there are more than two possible
outcomes, I use a multinomial logistic regression in which ∧ is a link function, and 𝛼 is a
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constant. I include the predictor variables of the same quarter 𝑄$ and the previous quarter
[D] is the size of the effect of 𝑋 , EBITDA from 𝑄 , on
𝑄$0- in my model. Therefore, 𝛽F
-#$
$
-

F
[D] is
predicting the odds of firm 𝑖 adopting policy P in the same quarter. Respectively, 𝛽
2
[𝑃]
the size of the effect of Debt from 𝑄$ , 𝑋2#$ ; 𝛽F
is the size of the effect of Book-to3
[D] is the size of the effect of Cash Holdings from 𝑄 , 𝑋
Market from 𝑄$ , 𝑋3#$ ; 𝛽F
$
4#$ ; and
4
[D] is the size of the effect of Firm Size from 𝑄 , 𝑋
𝛽F
$
5#$ , on predicting the odds of policy
5

type in 𝑄$ . Furthermore, to look at the effects of the previous quarter, I include the
[D] is the size of the effect of EBITDA from 𝑄
following covariates: 𝛽F
$0- , 𝑋6#($0-) , on
6
[D] is the size of the
predicting the odds of firm 𝑖 adopting policy P in 𝑄$ . Respectively, 𝛽F
=
[D] is the size of the effect of Book-to-Market from
effect of Debt from 𝑄$0- , 𝑋=#($0-) ; 𝛽F
>
[D] is the size of the effect of Cash Holdings from 𝑄
𝑄$0- , 𝑋>#($0-); 𝛽F
$0- ,
?

[𝑃]
𝑋>#($0-) ; 𝛽F
is the size of the effect of Firm Size from 𝑄$0- , 𝑋-@#($0-) . 𝜗#$ is a control
10

term representing the 11 industries in my sample, and 𝜖#$ is an error term.

V. Empirical Findings
I interpret the bivariate and multinomial logistic models’ coefficients for direction
and magnitude of associations. I convert the effects captured in the first two bivariate
logistic regressions into odds ratios. The odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients for
the respective regression. I find the percent change in odds by subtracting 1 from the odds
ratio and multiplying the difference by 100. However, I interpret many of the odds ratios
at the 1% level because a 1-unit change interpretation would be unrealistic given that
many of the covariates evaluating firm characteristics are ratios.
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5.1 Characteristics of COVID-19 Dividend Cutting Firms
After regressing quarterly dividend cuts in 2020 on my proxy variables for firm
characteristics from the previous quarter, I find a firm’s EBITDA, Debt, Book-to-Market
ratio, Cash Holdings, and Size are significant predictors of their likelihood to declare
dividend cuts. These results are depicted in Table 7. Once I include industry controls,
Firm Size loses its statistical significance in the model. Though I find a relationship
between a firm’s earnings and their decision to cut dividends during COVID-19, the
effects of EBITDA in my model are not as prominent as existing dividend payout
literature describes. I find that a 0.01 unit decrease in EBITDA scaled by total assets in
the previous quarter increases the odds of cutting dividends by less than 1%. These
findings demonstrate that earnings are not as important in dividend adjustments during
shocks like COVID-19 as with long-term dividend policy setting (Lintner 1956). I find
that a firm’s debt and book-to-market ratio have larger effects in my model. Higher debt
in the previous quarter increases the odds of cutting dividends throughout 2020. The odds
of cutting dividends in a quarter impacted by the pandemic are 5.1% higher for every
0.01 unit increase in a firm’s debt to assets ratio in the quarter prior. The significance of
debt is to be expected following Brav et al. 's (2005) discussions with managers regarding
their views on the allocation of funds for debt versus dividends. My results also illustrate
the relationship between a firm’s growth opportunities and their decision to cut
dividends. Since the average book-to-market ratio in my sample of dividend-paying firms
fluctuates at the 10% level from quarter to quarter, I interpret a 0.1 unit decrease in a
firm’s book-to-market ratio in the quarter prior, and I find that it decreases the odds of
cutting dividend payout by roughly 10%. In other words, firms that are valued by
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investors as having high-growth potential are less likely to cut dividends during the
pandemic. This is surprising since previous literature found firms with high market-tobook ratios, and low book-to-market ratios, faced greater uncertainty than more mature
companies during economic shocks (Avramov et al. 2004). Another surprising finding is
the positive relationship between a firm’s cash position and their decision to cut
dividends during 2020. A 0.01 unit increase in cash scaled by total assets going into the
quarter increases the odds a firm will cut dividends by 6.1%. I capture differences among
industries in their likelihood of cutting dividends in 2020. As seen in Figure 3, dividend
cuts are more frequent among firms in the Consumer Discretionary industry, while firms
in the Utilities and Communication Services space are less likely to cut dividends.
5.2 Characteristics of COVID-19 Employment Cutting Firms
Table 8 shows my regression results. Similar to my earlier findings on dividend
cutting firms, company earnings are statistically significant in predicting the odds a firm
will choose to respond to the pandemic by reducing their workforce, but their impact is
still small. In regard to employment cuts that occurred from March to June 2020, a 0.01
unit decrease in EBITDA for the second quarter, April through June, increases the odds a
firm will cut dividends in that same quarter by around 1%, while a firm’s earnings from
the first quarter, January to March, are statistically insignificant in my model. I am able to
separate the effects of the covariates on a firm’s decision to layoff versus furlough or not
pay workers by running additional bivariate logistic regressions that take on almost
identical forms to the regression on employment cuts. The response variable changes
from employment cuts to layoffs, and then again to furloughs or unpaid leave. I drop the
healthcare industry from the regression focusing on firm layoffs because there are no
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health care firms that laid off workers from March to June of the pandemic in my sample.
I exclude the utilities industry from all the regressions in this section since my sample of
firms in this industry did not cut employment in 2020 Q2. Through these additional
regressions, I find that firms who had furloughs or unpaid leave are driving the results
that earnings in the second quarter are telling of which companies will cut employment
early in the pandemic. The results are still empirically insignificant though. A company’s
cash position and size in both Q1 and Q2 confound industry effects and differences on
employment. The findings on the effects of firm size are initially puzzling because they
differ in direction for Q1 and Q2. Firms that report larger total assets in the months prior
to the employee cuts are more likely to cut employees in the second quarter of 2020. On
the other hand, a 1% increase in firm size, measured as the log of total assets, in the
second quarter decreases the odds of cutting employees in the second quarter. However,
these firm size covariates lose significance once industry controls are included in the
model. The industry controls separate the covariates by sector which ultimately leads to a
decrease in the firm size effect after including sectors in the regression. I find the odds a
Consumer Discretionary firm will lay off or furlough workers is roughly 4 times higher
than firms in all other industries. Firms within the Consumer Discretionary industry cut
employment and dividends at much higher rates. On the other hand, firms in the
Financials sector are not likely to respond to the pandemic by cutting employment. In
line with previous literature, I find COVID-19 disproportionately affected different
sectors, and policy responses differ across industries as well.
5.3 Firm Characteristics for Dividend and Employment Policy Decisions
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I evaluate the four possible combinations of employment and dividend policies
firms can take during 2020. Policy 1, maintaining or increasing both employment and
dividend payout, is the base outcome for my model. I include industry controls in my
regression. My results are presented in Table 11. I interpret the coefficients of my
multinomial logistic regression for magnitude and direction. I find that identifiable firm
characteristics increase the odds of which policy a company will choose relative to Policy
1.
A higher EBITDA from Qt decreases the likelihood that firms will choose a
policy in which they cut dividends and/or cut employment. However, earnings from Qt-1
are insignificant predictors of policy choices in my model. Firms that have less cash and
fewer short-term investments in the previous and current quarter are more likely to
choose Policy 2, a shareholder friendly policy, instead of Policy 1. Likewise, the
likelihood of implementing Policy 2 increases as a firm’s size in Qt-1 increases as well,
but the odds decrease in Qt as firm’s get larger. The same applies for firms choosing
Policy 3, a stakeholder friendly policy, relative to Policy 1. The similarities between
firms choosing stakeholder or shareholder friendly policies indicates that there are firm
characteristics beyond financial metrics that determine if companies choose more divisive
employment and dividend payout policies during times of heightened uncertainty. My
findings also highlight how policies in which employment and dividend payout policy
choices are distinctly different from each other, Policy 2 and Policy 3 for example, are
more closely predicted by a firm’s financials during the pandemic.

VI. Robustness
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I investigate correlation among the covariates in my models to ensure the
significance of my predicted outcomes are not skewed by their correlation to other
variables. I find all firm characteristics are not significantly correlated with each other. I
run additional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and probit regressions to compare the
results from my logit model. The findings are similar across regressions. I exclude these
robustness checks from this paper for simplicity and brevity.

VII. Conclusion
I study the determinants of dividend payout and employment policies in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. By observing the actions companies took from Q1 to Q4
2020, I am able to analyze firm policies at the onset and height of the pandemic. I divide
my paper into three sections to best research company decisions of interest. First, I run a
bivariate logistic regression to predict the effects of firm characteristics going into the
quarter on the odds that firms will implement YoY dividend cuts in 2020. Then, I run a
bivariate logistic regression analyzing the effects of firm characteristics from the first two
quarters in 2020 on predicting the odds firms will cut employment as an immediate
reaction to the spread of COVID-19. Lastly, I group employment and dividend payout
policies to analyze the relationship between firm characteristics and their prioritization of
stakeholders and shareholders. I include industry-level controls in all my models.
I contribute to the divided literature on dividend payout and employment during
times of uncertainty. My research adds to the limited literature on the interaction of
dividend payout and employment policies. I also provide additional analysis into the
actions of companies during the COVID-19 pandemic since existing literature is limited
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to the first two quarters of 2020. Similar to Krieger et al. (2020), I find firms reduced
dividend payout at high rates in 2020.
Though earnings have been established as a significant predictor in setting
dividend payout policy, I find EBITDA from the previous quarter has empirically
insignificant effects in increasing the odds firms cut dividends in 2020. I observe a
similar insignificance when analyzing the relationship between earnings and employment
cuts in the first half of 2020. In fact, I find none of the firm characteristics included in my
equations, aside from the industry controls, change the odds firms will cut employment in
the months when COVID-19’s potential for destruction became apparent throughout the
world. On the contrary, I find a relationship between firm characteristics and dividend
cuts in 2020. Larger debt, greater cash, and fewer growth prospects in the previous
quarter increase the odds firms will reduce dividends. The effect of cash holdings is
puzzling since I would suspect cash should protect things like dividend payout policy
during times of uncertainty.
When I group dividend and employment decisions during 2020, I find firm size
has a significant effect on the likelihood a company will choose a shareholder friendly
(Policy 2) or stakeholder friendly (Policy 3) policy. A company that is larger in the
previous quarter is more likely to implement Policy 2 or Policy 3 relative to Policy 1,
while the opposite is true when observing company size during the quarter in which the
policy is exercised. It is surprising that firm characteristics like firm size have similar
directional effects on the odds firms will choose stakeholder friendly or shareholder
friendly policies. This highlights how there may be other more salient firm-specific
factors that dictate employment and dividend payout policy decisions. As discussed in
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Brav et al. (2005), managerial preferences are a big determinant of dividend policy. I was
not able to account for executive characteristics in my model.
I also find contrasting effects when evaluating firm characteristics observed in the
previous quarter and firm metrics reported in the quarter in which a stakeholder friendly
policy was observed. A firm that reported a stronger cash position in the previous quarter
is less likely to implement a stakeholder friendly policy, while a firm demonstrating
strong cash flows in the same quarter as the policy change is more likely to choose a
policy that prioritizes employees over stockholders.
The intensity of the COVID-19 pandemic makes it a remarkable proxy to predict
firm policy changes during economics shocks and uncertainty. However, due to the
pandemic’s complexity, there are many global factors that I was not able to isolate and
account for in my model. Many firms with varying characteristics faced similar
restrictions from lenders in 2020 which may have skewed my results. The Paycheck
Protection Program was created with the intention of helping companies maintain or
increase their employment during the pandemic, so employees had to be kept on the
company payroll (“Paycheck Protection Program Resources ” 2020). Additionally,
companies that accepted money from the U.S. government through the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief and Economic Security Act could not payout dividends within the period of the
loan (Courtney, H.R.748 - CARES Act 2020). Another limitation in my paper lies in my
firm sample. I evaluate firms from the Russell 1000 which excludes firms whose market
capitalization falls under the top 1000 companies in the United States.
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VIII. Tables and Figures
Table 1
Frequency of 2020 COVID-19 Dividend Cuts compared to 2019
This table gives the quarterly breakdown of the number of firms that cut dividends in 2020 in comparison to the contemporaneous
quarter the year prior (2019). Firms that “cut” dividends are defined as having quarterly dividends per share that were lower in Qt 2020
respective to Qt 2019. The dividend payout information is from COMPUSTAT for the period of Q1 2019 to Q4 2020.

YoY (post-COVID versus pre-COVID)
Cut

No Cut

% of Sample with
Dividend Cuts

2020, Q1

19

618

3%

2020, Q2

89

548

14%

2020, Q3

98

536

15.5%

2020, Q4

99

529

15.8%

2020, Total

305

637

47.9%
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Table 2
Frequency of Employment Cuts Early in the Pandemic
This table gives the breakdown of the number of firms that cut employment, either in the form of furloughs and unpaid leave or layoffs,
from March 1, 2020 to June 26, 2020. These months fall within the first and second calendar quarters of the year, and employment cuts
that occurred in these months signal an early policy response to the pandemic. An employment cut consists of a reduction of any size in
the company payroll. The employment information is from Just Capital.

Cut

No Cut

% of Sample with Cuts

Furloughs or Unpaid Leave

103

534

16.2%

Layoffs

63

574

9.9%

Either Employment Cut

129

508

20.3%
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Table 3
Frequency of Quarters in which Dividend were Cut by GICS Sector
This table gives the industry breakdown of the number of quarters in which firms cut dividends in 2020 in comparison to the
contemporaneous quarter the year prior (2019). Each n in “Quarters in 2020 Where Dividends Were Cut” represents the actions of one
firm in one quarter in 2020. For example, if two firms cut dividends in Q1 2020, the quarters in 2020 where dividends were cut would
equal two. The dividend payout and GICS sector information comes from COMPUSTAT. Firms that “cut” dividends are defined as
having quarterly dividends per share that were lower in Qt 2020 respective to Qt 2019.

Companies in Sample

Quarters in 2020 where
Dividends Were Cut

Energy

34

32

Materials

46

14

Industrials

111

53

Consumer Discretionary

73

98

Consumer Staples

40

12

Healthcare

44

6

Financials

128

28

Information Technology

65

18

Communication Services

20

2

Utilities

37

5

Real Estate

39

37

Total

637

305
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Table 4
Frequency of Employment Cuts Early in the Pandemic by GICS Sector
This table gives the industry breakdown of the number of firms that cut employment, either in the form of furloughs and unpaid leave
or layoffs, from March 1, 2020 to June 26, 2020. These months fall within the first and second calendar quarter of the year, and
employment cuts that occurred in these months signal an early policy response to the pandemic. An employment cut consists of a
reduction of any size in the company payroll. The employment information is from Just Capital.

Companies in
Sample

Companies with
Employment Cuts

% of Industry Sample
with Employee Cuts

Energy

34

7

20.6%

Materials

46

6

13%

Industrials

111

43

38.7%

Consumer Discretionary

73

40

54.8%

Consumer Staples

40

6

15%

Healthcare

44

3

6.8%

Financials

128

3

2.3%

Information Technology

65

5

7.7%

Communication Services

20

8

40%

Utilities

37

0

0%

Real Estate

39

8

20.5%

Total

637

129

20.3%

33

Table 5
Summary of Firm Financial Metrics at the Close of the Lagged Quarter
This table shows the quarterly means and yearly minimums, maximums, and means of the financial variables at the lagged quarter close.
The variables used in this paper are defined as follows: EBITDA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets, Cash
Holdings is the sum of cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets, Debt is the sum of current and long-term debt scaled by
total assets, Book-to-Market ratio is the total book value of common equity over the total market value, and Firm Size is the logarithm
of total assets.
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Table 6
Summary of Firm Financial Metrics at the Close of the Contemporaneous Quarter
This table shows the quarterly means and yearly minimums, maximums, and means of the financial variables at the contemporaneous
quarter close. The variables used in this paper are defined as follows: EBITDA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by
total assets, Cash Holdings is the sum of cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets, Debt is the sum of current and longterm debt scaled by total assets, Book-to-Market ratio is the total book value of common equity over the total market value, and Firm
Size is the logarithm of total assets.
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Table 7
Bivariate logistic regression predicting quarterly dividend cuts during the pandemic
The table presents the results of bivariate logistic regressions of dividend cuts on firm financial characteristics. Dividend cut is an indicator
variable equal to 1 for each quarter in which a firm cut YoY dividends in 2020. Regression (1) does not control for industry fixed effects,
while regression (2) does. EBITDA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets, Cash Holdings is the sum of cash
and short-term investments scaled by total assets, Debt is the sum of current and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Book-to-Market
ratio is the total book value of common equity over the total market value, and Firm Size is the logarithm of total assets. I convert the
effects captured in the second bivariate logistic regression into odds-ratios. The odds-ratios are the exponentiated coefficients for the
respective regression.
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Table 8
Bivariate logistic regression predicting employment cuts as a policy response early in the
pandemic
The table presents the results of bivariate logistic regressions of employment cuts on firm financial characteristics. Employment cut is an
indicator variable equal to 1 for each firm that cut employment, either in the form of furloughs and unpaid leave or layoffs, from March
1, 2020 to June 26, 2020. Layoffs is an indicator variable equal to 1 for each firm that laid off workers in the observed period. Furloughs
or Unpaid Leave is an indicator variable equal to 1 for each firm that furloughed or did not pay workers in the observed period.
Regression (1) of Employment does not control for industry fixed effects, while regression (2) does. Regression (1) of Layoffs and
Furloughs or Unpaid Leave controls for industry fixed effects. The covariates are defined as follows: EBITDA is the operating income
before depreciation scaled by total assets, Cash Holdings is the sum of cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets, Debt is
the sum of current and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Book-to-Market ratio is the total book value of common equity over the
total market value, and Firm Size is the logarithm of total assets. I convert the effects captured in the regressions into odds-ratios. The
odds-ratios are the exponentiated coefficients for the respective regression.

37

38

Table 9
Matrix showing the four possible policy paths companies can take during the pandemic

Maintain or Increase
Dividends

Cut Dividends

Maintain or Increase
Employment
Policy 1
Maintain or Increase
Dividends & Maintain or
Increase Employment
Policy 3
(Stakeholder Friendly)
Cut Dividends &
Maintain or Increase
Employment

Cut Employment
Policy 2
(Shareholder Friendly)
Maintain or Increase
Dividends & Cut
Employment
Policy 4
Cut Dividends & Cut
Employment
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Table 10
Frequency of Company Policies
This table gives the policy breakdown for the firms in my sample. Policy 1 indicates firms that maintained or increased both dividends
and employment. Policy 2 indicates firms that maintained or increased dividends while cutting employment. Policy 3 indicates firms
that cut dividends while maintaining or increasing their labor force. Policy 4 indicates firms that cut both dividends and employment
during 2020.

Number of Companies

% of Sample

Policy 1

465

73%

Policy 2

83

13%

Policy 3

43

6.8%

Policy 4

46

7.2%
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Table 11
Multinomial logistic regression predicting firm employment and dividend decisions
during the pandemic
The table presents the results of multinomial logistic regressions of policy choices on firm financial characteristics. The four policy
outcomes are indicator variables equal to 1 for each firm that exercised that policy in 2020. Policy 1 indicates firms that maintained or
increased both dividends and employment. Policy 2 indicates firms that maintained or increased dividends while cutting employment.
Policy 3 indicates firms that cut dividends while maintaining or increasing their labor force. Policy 4 indicates firms that cut both
dividends and employment during 2020. I control for industry fixed effects in the regressions. The covariates are constructed as follows:
EBITDA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets, Cash Holdings is the sum of cash and short-term investments
scaled by total assets, Debt is the sum of current and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Book-to-Market ratio is the total book value
of common equity over the total market value, and Firm Size is the logarithm of total assets.
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